Thank you for your reply.
These are arguments that sovereign citizens groups make, but regulation of driving on roads is a state function and they have a right to regulate those functions, even on commercial highways, as they are not preventing transportation, it is just regulation within their authority.
You went to court and you were convicted you said you were "tried and convicted" which is your due process rights.
The Supreme Court has recognized a protected right to interstate travel, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,500, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 143 L.Ed.2d 689 (1999), and the Sixth Circuit has recognized a protected right to intrastate travel, i.e., "aright to travel locally through public spaces and roadways,"Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 494-98 (6th Cir. 2002).LULAC, 2004 WL(###) ###-####at *4. Yet, the district court held theprotected right to travel does not embody a right to a driver licenseor a right to a particular mode of transportation, citing Duncan v.Cone, 2000 WL(###) ###-####(6th Cir.) (unpublished) (holding "thereis no fundamental right to drive a motor vehicle."); John Doe No. 1 v. Georgia Dep't of Public Safety, 147 F.Supp.2d 1369, 1375(N.D.Ga.2001) (observing that "the Circuit Courts have uniformly held that burdens on a single mode of transportation do not implicate the right to interstate travel," and collecting cases). Further,the district court held that the right to travel, whatever its contours, is not infringed by Chapter 778 because a person who receives a certificate for driving is able to operate a motor vehicle just like a person who receives a driver license. Potential difficulties that may be experienced by one who does not have a driver license to use for identification purposes were held not to implicate the right to travel.
In Saenz, the Supreme Court identified three components of the right to travel: "It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than anunfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and,for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens in that State." 526 U.S.at 500, 119 S.Ct. 1518.
A state law implicates the right to travel when it actually deters travel, when impeding travel is its primary objective, or when it uses a classification that serves to penalize the exercise of the right. Attorney General of New York v.Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986). Tennessee's issuance of certificates for driving, which confer all the same driving privileges as driver licenses, is clearly not designed primarily to impede travel and can hardly be said to deteror penalize travel. The state's denial of state-issued photograph identification to temporary resident aliens may arguably result in inconvenience, requiring the bearer of a certificate for driving to carry other personal identification papers, but this inconveniencecan hardly be said to deter or penalize travel. To the extent this inconvenience burdens exercise of the right to travel at all, theburden is incidental and negligible, insufficient to implicate denial of the right to travel. See Town of Southold v. Town of East Hampton,477 F.3d 38, 54 (2d Cir.2007) (collecting cases recognizing that evencitizens do not have a constitutional right to the most convenient form of travel). Something more than a negligible or minimal impacton the right to travel is required before strict scrutiny is applied.State of Kansas v. United States, 16 F.3d 436, 442 (D.C.Cir.1994).