Gentile v. Nulty, 769 F. Supp. 2d 573, 578 (USDC SD NY 2/25/2011) ("Under a similar theory of selective enforcement, a plaintiff may prevail on an equal protection claim by showing (1) that he was treated differently from others similarly situated, and (2) 'that such differential treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.' Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 507 F.3d 778, 790 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).")
Heusser v. Hale, 777 F. Supp. 2d 366, 385(USDC Conn. 4/15/2011) ("It is well settled that, [t]o establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause based on selective enforcement, a plaintiff must ordinarily show the following: (1) [that] the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person." Emmerling v. Town of Richmond, 09-CV-6418 (CJS), 2010 WL(NNN) NNN-NNNN at *12, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130948, at *35 (W.D.N.Y. July 23, 2010) (quoting Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 234 (2d Cir.2004)). Thus, in order to state a valid claim for 'selective enforcement,' Plaintiffs must allege that they were treated differently than others similarly situated and that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations."
Payne v. Huntington Union Free School Dist., 219 F. Supp. 2d 273, 277 (USDC ED NY 7/26/2002) ("The seminal selective enforcement case in the Second Circuit is LaTrieste Restaurant & Cabaret, Inc. v. Village of Port Chester, 40 F.3d 587 (2d Cir.1994). To prevail in a selective enforcement claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that she was selectively treated in comparison with others similarly situated; and (2) the selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person. Id. at 590.¶The Supreme Court, however, has cast doubt on the validity of the second prong of LaTrieste, insofar as it requires that the selective enforcement be motivated by either an impermissible motive or a malicious intent to injure the person. In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) (per curiam), the Supreme Court held that a complaint which alleged that the complained-of enforcement was 'irrational and wholly arbitrary' was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, irrespective of whether the complaint had pled that the motivation was due to 'ill will' or the like. Id. at 565, 120 S.Ct. 1073.
The above shows six cases, all of which seem to be relatively closes intertwined with the same basic principles. As I read through the other case summaries, everything seems similar -- which to me means that if you can't find something useful in the above-cited case law, then you'll probably need a different legal theory to bring a claim.
Hope this helps.
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