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Law Educator, Esq.
Law Educator, Esq., Lawyer
Category: Family Law
Satisfied Customers: 114796
Experience:  Experienced attorney: Family law, Estate Law, SS Law etc.
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In Florida, what's the proper motion to request an order by

Customer Question

In Florida, what's the proper motion to request an order by the court to put aside or discharge temporary custody orders after a voluntary dismissal of a supplemental petition to modify custody?
Submitted: 7 months ago.
Category: Family Law
Expert:  AttyHeather replied 7 months ago.

Hi! I'm Heather. I've been a practicing attorney for the last 15 years, and I'd be happy to assist you for informational and educational purposes.

Customer: replied 7 months ago.
In Florida, what's the proper motion to request an order by the court to put aside or discharge temporary custody orders after a voluntary dismissal of a supplemental petition to modify custody?
Expert:  AttyHeather replied 7 months ago.

The Order of Dismissal of the Petition to Modify Custody would be the order that set aside the temporary custody order. Since the Petition to Modify was dismissed, the orders entered pursuant to that petition would no longer have effect. So if you have the order of dismissal, you already have the order you need. Does that make sense?

Customer: replied 7 months ago.
It seems that way but I need case law to support that.
Customer: replied 7 months ago.
it was a voluntary dismissal by the petitioner. Not an order of dismissal.
Customer: replied 7 months ago.
Hello? Why was I charged the entire amount?! Your answer was not satisfactory. You said an ORDER of dismissal operates as the dismissal of the temporary orders. My question did not indicate there was any ORDER of dismissal. Please respond.
Expert:  AttyHeather replied 7 months ago.

I'd like to help you if I can. I'm not in customer service. I'm a lawyer. I do not handle the charges, which you seem upset about, so I don't know what was charged, but I am fine with helping you with your follow up questions on the dismissal to your satisfaction.

Expert:  AttyHeather replied 7 months ago.

The Florida statute on dismissal of actions states:

RULE 1.420 DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS

(a) Voluntary Dismissal.

(1) By Parties. Except in actions in which property has been seized or is in the custody of the court, an action may be dismissed by plaintiff without order of court (A) before trial by serving, or during trial by stating on the record, a notice of dismissal at any time before a hearing on motion for summary judgment, or if none is served or if the motion is denied, before retirement of the jury in a case tried before a jury or before submission of a nonjury case to the court for decision, or (B) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits when served by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court an action based on or including the same claim.

Based on the statute in your jurisdiction, the notice of dismissal itself operates as an adjudication dismissing the claim on its merits.

I am not aware of any cases that go into your specific situation.

It sounds like you want something else from the court actually setting aside the temporary orders in your case. If you don't have an attorney, you are free to write up your own motion and submit it to the court along with a proposed order setting aside the temporary orders. You can explain to the judge why you want the order. The judge will probably think its not necessary in light of the statute I just cited, but the judge might nevertheless sign the order, since there really is not any statute that would prohibit him from doing so.

Does that make sense?

Please let me know if that has helped you more?

Customer: replied 7 months ago.
My frustrated response was caused by seeing the charge assessed after your initial response. I just haven't been on here in a good while and the payment procedure has changed. Sorry. Thank you for trying to continue to help. I am familiar with that rule of procedure. What you underscored though, does not apply. The sentence above it (A) is the situation we have. It was solely voluntarily dismissed by the petitioner. The (B) line does not apply. When I used this website in the past, an attorney would find case law I couldn't find on my own. I was hoping you could give me at least one Florida case about temporary orders being void in a custody modification case when there is a voluntary dismissal of the petition.
Expert:  AttyHeather replied 7 months ago.

The underlined portion applies to both sections A and B.

Expert:  AttyHeather replied 7 months ago.

Just letting you know that I have been reading cases on your topic for the last while trying to find something on point. Nothing so far... Few more to go though.

Expert:  AttyHeather replied 7 months ago.

Read this and let me know if you think it is helpful. I don't know if it is quite on point enough, but it's the closest I've found:

In Randle-Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So.2d 68 (Fla.1978), the Supreme Court dealt with a similar question. There, plaintiff's counsel took a voluntary dismissal but later filed a motion for relief from the dismissal upon learning that he had made a mistake concerning the running of the applicable statute of limitations. The Third District agreed with the trial court's granting of the motion on the theory that a voluntary dismissal was a "proceeding" which may be reached by a claim of mistake under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540(b), Randle-Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Vasta, 345 So.2d 1084, 1085 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977). The Supreme court disagreed holding that no "proceeding" existed upon which Rule 1.540(b) could operate and that the trial court lost jurisdiction upon the filing of the Rule 1.420(a) voluntary dismissal. Stated the court:

The right to dismiss one's own lawsuit during the course of trial is guaranteed by Rule 1.420(a), endowing a plaintiff with unilateral authority to block action favorable to a defendant which the trial judge might be disposed to approve. The effect is to remove completely from the court's consideration the power to enter an order, equivalent in all respects to a deprivation of "jurisdiction." If the trial judge loses the ability to exercise judicial discretion or to adjudicate the cause in any way, it follows that he has no jurisdiction

445 So.2d 594

to reinstate a dismissed proceeding. The policy reasons for this consequence support its apparent rigidity.

Customer: replied 7 months ago.
I see the last sentence does apply to both A and B but the last part of it is not in our situation: "...who has once dismissed in any court an action based on or including the same claim." The claims were not voluntarily dismissed once before. Thank you for looking for case law.
Expert:  AttyHeather replied 7 months ago.

That clip was taken from

  • Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Prescott, 445 So.2d 591 (1 Dist. 1984)
  • Florida Court of Appeals, First District
  • January 20, 1984
Expert:  AttyHeather replied 7 months ago.

This next case holds that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to do much of anything of the case after the notice of dismissal is filed.

395 So.2d 1285 (Fla.App. 2 Dist. 1981)

Brian BEVAN, Appellant,

v.

Joseph P. D'ALESSANDRO, as State Attorney for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, Appellee.

No. 80-1662.

Florida Court of Appeals, Second District.

April 1, 1981

Brian Bevan, pro se.

***** *****, Atty. Gen., Pamela L. Lutton, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mary K. Kraemer, Certified Legal Intern, Tallahassee, for appellee.

BOARDMAN, Judge.

Brian Bevan appeals the trial court's dismissal with prejudice of his replevin action for failure to prosecute. The court's dismissal was entered after appellant had entered a voluntarydismissal. We reverse.

On October 20, 1978, appellant filed a complaint for return of a certain taped conversation, which he claimed he was entitled to pursuant to an agreement with the state attorney. It was dismissed with leave to amend, and appellant filed an amended complaint. Various motions were subsequently filed, one during January and the last on June 18, 1979. No further record activity occurred until June 27, 1980, when the state filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. Appellant received a copy of the motion, and on July 30, 1980, five days before the scheduled hearing on the motion, he voluntarily dismissed the case pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a)(1). The hearing on the state's motion nevertheless took place, with the result that the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice. The order was predicated upon appellant's failure to prosecute and his failure to comply with rule 1.420(e), which requires a plaintiff to show good cause, in writing, within five days before the hearing on a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, why his action should remain pending.

Though we have been unable to locate a case which precisely addresses the situation involving the use of rule 1.420(a)(1) to avoid operation of rule

395 So.2d 1286

1.420(e), a number of cases have held that a party has an absolute right to take a voluntary dismissal at any time prior to a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, before the jury retires, or before submission of a nonjury case to the court for decision. Fears v. Lunsford, 314 So.2d 578 (Fla.1975); Ambassador Insurance Co. v. Highlands General Hospital, 383 So.2d 254 (Fla.2d DCA 1980); Meyer v. Contemporary Broadcasting Co., 207 So.2d 325 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968); Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 1113, 1167 § 14(b). This right is so entrenched that in Randall-Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So.2d 68 (Fla.1978), the trial court was not allowed to set aside a voluntary dismissal even when a plaintiff who had taken a voluntary dismissal quickly asked the court to set it aside after discovering that the statute of limitations had run on his wrongful death action. Our supreme court held that the plaintiff's voluntary dismissal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to subsequently relieve the plaintiff's attorney of the consequences of his tactical error.

We are aware that in Select Builders of Florida, Inc. v. Wong, 367 So.2d 1089 (Fla.3d DCA 1979), the court carved out a narrow exception to the general rule, holding a voluntary dismissalinoperative in situations where fraud on the court was attempted by the filing of a voluntary dismissal. There, however, the plaintiff had received affirmative relief to which he was not entitled and sought to avoid correction of the trial court's error by taking a voluntary dismissal. Here, on the other hand, appellant has received no affirmative relief, nor does his action in taking a voluntarydismissal rise to the level of a fraud on the court under the circumstances. Therefore, although we feel appellant has thwarted the intent and purpose of the rule, his absolute right to the benefits of rule 1.420(a)(1) superseded his responsibility to comply with rule 1.420(e).

Accordingly, having determined that the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear appellee's motion to dismiss after appellant's voluntary dismissal, we REVERSE and REMAND the cause for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

HOBSON, Acting C. J., and DANAHY, J., concur.

Customer: replied 7 months ago.
I've been searching for hours and hours but I'm not an attorney and do not have nexus lexus or westlaw. I need a case that either states the temporary orders are void/without affect or showing someone filed some kind of proper motion to put aside those temporary orders after the dismissal. I thought a civil rule 1.540 motion to put aside orders because they are void would work but it "seems" that the rule is for final orders.
Expert:  AttyHeather replied 7 months ago.

Here's one that states the notice of dismissal terminates the action:

428 So.2d 334 (Fla.App. 2 Dist. 1983)

UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Appellant,

v.

Glenda JOHNSON and James S. Johnson, Appellees.

No. 82-1724.

Florida Court of Appeals, Second District.

March 18, 1983

428 So.2d 335

Albert B. Lewis of Piper, Esteva, Karvonen & Lewis, St. Petersburg, for appellant.

Robert J. Shapiro, Tampa, for appellees.

RYDER, Judge.

United Services Automobile Association (USAA) appeals from the trial court's granting of a motion for relief from an order of dismissal. The court's dismissal was granted after appellees had entered a voluntary dismissal against appellant for damages in an automobile accident. We reverse.

Appellant carried uninsured motorist protection for appellees Glenda and James S. Johnson. On January 23, 1977, the Johnsons were involved in a collision during which they were struck from behind by two vehicles. The first was driven by an uninsured motorist, not a party to the instant action. Appellees were struck a second time when the uninsured vehicle was hit by Charles S. Johnson, an insured of Allstate Insurance Company, and no relation to appellees.

In April 1980, appellees filed suit against both ***** ***** and Allstate, as well as against USAA for the uninsured motorist coverage. After the case was filed, USAA argued successfully that all proceedings against it should be stayed pending the outcome of the action against Johnson and Allstate. An order of abatement as to USAA was entered on October 1, 1980, and the cause proceeded to discovery. Eventually, a settlement was reached among Johnson, Allstate and appellees. On April 6, 1981, a joint stipulation and an order of dismissal were entered dismissing the case against all parties concerned including USAA. Appellees subsequently filed a motion for relief from the dismissal order in January 1982 stating that the inclusion of USAA in the order had been either by mistake, inadvertance or excusable neglect pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540. The trial court entered an order on June 24, 1982, granting the relief and reinstating the cause of action against USAA from which this appeal is taken.

Despite the earlier voluntary dismissal, the trial judge herein asserted that he had retained jurisdiction both to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion for relief and subsequently to grant the order of relief. Although he acknowledged the well-settled rule that the trial court loses jurisdiction to reinstate a cause of action after a voluntary dismissal under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420, he found the rule inapplicable in the case citing McKibbin v. Fujarek, 385 So.2d 724 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Additionally, he held that the joint stipulation and the order for dismissal had been signed erroneously as a result of confusion in procedure in the office of appellees' attorney, and so set aside the stipulation and order on the basis of "mistake and accidental slip of counsel." After reviewing the record, we disagree.

The case of McKibbin concerned a plaintiff who filed a suit in both Broward and Dade Counties for personal injuries. Pursuant to an agreement with opposing counsel, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal in the Broward County action, but contended that the notice inadvertently contained the words "with prejudice." He was granted leave to amend his notice of dismissal to exclude those words in accordance with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(a). Later, the appellate court found the elimination of "with prejudice" was error, but it did agree that the lower court had retained jurisdiction even after a voluntary dismissal to correct clerical mistakes and errors from oversight or omission under rule 1.540(a). See also Shampaine Industries, Inc. v. South Broward Hospital District, 411 So.2d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).

The current rule regarding jurisdiction after the entry of a voluntary dismissal was set out by the supreme court in Randle-Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So.2d 68 (Fla.1978). There, the court

428 So.2d 336

held that a voluntary dismissal under rule 1.420(a)(1)(i) terminates the action and divests the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain a later request by plaintiff to reinstate the original action. We followed the same rule in Bevan v. D'Alessandro, 395 So.2d 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). More recently, in Carolina Casualty Co. v. General Truck Equipment & Trailer Sales, Inc., 407 So.2d 1095(Fla. 1st DCA 1982), the First District has held that the reasoning of Randle-Eastern concerning a voluntary dismissal under rule 1.420(a)(1)(i) applies equally to a voluntary dismissal under rule1.420(a)(2). See also Anderson v. Lovejoy, 354 So.2d 951 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Rich Motors, Inc. v. Loyd Cole Produce Express, Inc., 244 So.2d 526 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970).

Therefore, we hold that the trial court was divested of jurisdiction in the instant case upon the entry of appellees' voluntary dismissal and cannot now entertain a motion to reinstate the proceeding.

In light of the above, we need not reach appellant's second point regarding appellees' entitlement to relief under rule 1.540(b).

Accordingly, having determined that the trial judge was without jurisdiction to hear appellees' motion to grant relief after entry of their voluntary dismissal, we reverse and remand the cause for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.

HOBSON, Acting C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.

Expert:  AttyHeather replied 7 months ago.

There is nothing that comes up when I add the search term "temporary order" or "temporary orders" to the "voluntary dismissal" search. There are hundreds of cases coming up on the rule, but I just don't think the issue you want clarified has ever gone to the appellate court, because the court is so clear that the voluntary dismissal ends the action. Its like, in your situation, you want it said in a little different way... I'll keep looking...

Expert:  AttyHeather replied 7 months ago.

This case is close, but it specifically speaks to "subsequent" orders.

977 So.2d 692 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 2008)

33 Fla. L. Weekly D 769

Zander Lewis KELLY, Former Husband, Appellant,

v.

Clara A. COLSTON, Former Wife, Appellee.

No. 1D07-3594

Florida Court of Appeal, First District

March 18, 2008

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Gadsden County. George S. Reynolds, III, Judge.

977 So.2d 693

Suzanne Brownless, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ruth Stone, Supervising Attorney, and Daniel Blundy, Certified Legal Intern, FSU College of Law Public Interest Law Center, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

HAWKES, J.

The parties lived together and, several years after the birth of their only child, married. Less than a month later, the wife, pro se, filed for dissolution of marriage. Almost a year later, a hearing was held before a general magistrate. Ten days after the magistrate filed a report, the wife filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. Twenty days after the voluntary dismissal, the circuit judge entered a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. Approximately one year later, believing the dissolution to be valid, the husband filed a petition to modify the final judgment's terms of custody and visitation. The circuit court held a hearing on the husband's petition and issued its order denying modification of custody, but granting modification

977 So.2d 694

of visitation.[1] From this order, the husband appealed.

The issue we must consider is whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to enter the final judgment of dissolution, or any other order, after the wife filed her dismissal. This answer depends on whether the magistrate holding a hearing or filing a report with recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, constitutes "submission . . . to the court for decision" under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420. We conclude neither activity by the magistrate constitutes submission. Consequently, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction.

Effect Of Voluntary Dismissal On Jurisdiction

Under the Family Rules of Procedure, a voluntary dismissal of a petition for dissolution is governed by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420. See Fla. R. Fam. P. 12.420. This rule, which allows a petitioner to dismiss a petition, states in part, "an action may be dismissed by plaintiff without order of court... before submission of a nonjury case to the court for decision...." Fla. R. Civ. P. Rule 1.420 (emphasis added); see also Tobkin v. State, 777 So.2d 1160, 1163 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). The petitioner has a nearly absolute right to voluntarily dismiss. See Fears v. Lunsford,314 So.2d 578 (Fla. 1975). Fears involved a situation where a petitioner's voluntary dismissal was affirmed even though the trial court had orally announced, outside of the jury's hearing, that it would direct a verdict in favor of the defendant. Id.

The effect of a voluntary dismissal prior to submission is immediate, final, and irreversible. It terminates the litigation and instantaneously divests the court of its jurisdiction to enter further orders. See Randle-E. Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1978). This is equally true when the dismissal is taken in a dissolution action. See Hayden v. Hayden, 373 So.2d 436, 438 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (holding a dissolution action may be dismissed without leave of the court and, once taken, the court loses jurisdiction and power to exercise discretion or adjudicate the action in any way). A dismissal is effective, even though the best interests of the minor children might be affected. See Nathanson v. Nathanson, 693 So.2d 1061, 1062 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Consequently, if the petitioner files a voluntary dismissal before "submission" occurs, any further orders are null and void.

Here, the wife argues the court retained jurisdiction to enter the final judgment because submission occurred when the magistrate took testimony and evidence, or alternatively, submission occurred when the magistrate filed her report. This argument is without merit.

Activity By A Magistrate Is Not Submission

Neither a hearing before the magistrate nor the filing of a magistrate's report constitutes submission. Family law general magistrates, hearings, and reports are governed under Florida Rule of Family Procedure 12.490, which states in part:

(c) . . . Every general magistrate shall perform all the duties that pertain to the office according to the practice of chancery and rules of court and under the direction of the court . . . shall be empowered to administer oaths and conduct hearings.... [;] (e) . . . The general magistrate shall file a report that

977 So.2d 695

includes findings of fact and conclusions of law, together with recommendations. . . . [; and](f) . . . The general magistrate shall file the report and recommendations and serve copies on all parties. The parties may serve exceptions to the report within 10 days from the time it is served on them.... If no exceptions are filed within that period, the court shall take appropriate action on the report ....

(emphasis added).

After a magistrate holds a hearing and files a report, the circuit court has the duty to review the entire case file, examine the evidence presented to the magistrate, and determine whether the magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law are justified. See DeClements v. DeClements, 662 So.2d 1276, 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). A hearing by the magistrate or filing of the magistrate's report cannot constitute submission to the court for a decision when these remaining duties must be fulfilled by the circuit court before entering any order.[2] Here, the court had not started its review prior to the wife's filing of the notice of dismissal.

Conclusion

Because the case was not submitted to the court for decision prior to the filing of the voluntary dismissal, the circuit court was divested of jurisdiction. Since the court lacked jurisdiction to enter its dissolution order, it lacked jurisdiction to enter all related subsequent orders.[3] Thus, the final order dissolving the parties' marriage, and all subsequent orders based upon it, were void ab initio. See Dep't of Transp. v. Bailey, 603 So.2d 1384, 1386-87 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (holding a judgment is void if the court lacked jurisdiction to enter it, and if void, the judgment must be vacated); Wells v. State, 495 So.2d 1221, 1222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (holding subsequent orders based on a void order were void).

The appeal is hereby DISMISSED, and the January 25, 2005, dissolution order and all other orders subsequent to the voluntary dismissal are VACATED.

POLSTON and THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.

---------

Notes:

[1] Incidentally, the court's order modifying visitation failed to find the required substantial or material change in circumstances. See Krohn v. Foster, 856 So.2d 1130, 1131 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003);Henderson v. Henderson, 905 So.2d 901, 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Knipe v. Knipe, 840 So.2d 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

[2] Rule 12.490(f) also permits the parties to file exceptions. At a minimum, submission requires the close of all proceedings and all opportunities for the parties to make argument, which must include the authorized period in which to file exceptions.

[3] As the laws of Florida do not recognize common law marriage because parties erroneously believe they are married, see § 741.211, Fla. Stat. (2005), and Anderson v. Anderson, 577 So.2d 658, 660 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), likewise, the laws of Florida are unable to recognize a common law divorce even though the parties may believe they are divorced or hold themselves out as being divorced.

---------

Customer: replied 7 months ago.
of course it is super clear that it ends an action. But, there are temporary orders that have kept me from my son for a couple years of malicious litigation by his mother. I need something directly speaking to those temporary orders not having affect. I found in Pino v. The Bank of New York (Fla. 2013):
"...the voluntary dismissal tends to benefit the defendant because it terminates the litigation then pending against the defendant and extinguishes all obligations, conditions, or restrictions flowing therefrom."
That is the closest I have found to say infer that temporary orders in the case are extinguished. I would either need to find one case that says that but in place of all obligations,etc., it states any temporary/non final orders are extinguished/void/null/without affect OR a motion to officially set aside those orders.
Expert:  AttyHeather replied 7 months ago.

Have you considered that perhaps under the FL rule, that since there are Temporary Orders, that qualifies as a "trial" and perhaps, filing the Voluntary Dismissal was improper? You will note, the last clause of 1.420(a)(1), subsection (A) states that the Notice of Dismissal must be submitted (depending on the type of case) "before submission of a nonjury case to the court for decision."

Expert:  AttyHeather replied 7 months ago.

2016 California Rules of Court

Rule 3.1203. Time of notice to other parties

(a) Time of notice

A party seeking an ex parte order must notify all parties no later than 10:00 a.m. the court day before the ex parte appearance, absent a showing of exceptional circumstances that justify a shorter time for notice.

(Subd (a) amended effective January 1, 2008.)

Expert:  AttyHeather replied 7 months ago.

Please disregard that last comment.

Customer: replied 7 months ago.
I don't think anything out there so far could indicates that temporary orders are a "submission of a nonjury CASE to the court for Decision." The entire CASE is not Decided in the short, temporary relief hearings. I found in Pino v. The Bank of New York (Fla. 2013) that seems to only speak to [temporary orders of] obligations, conditions, restrictions that transpired in the pending litigation before it was voluntarily dismissed (before a final decision was to take place) :
"...the voluntary dismissal tends to benefit the defendant because it terminates the litigation then pending against the defendant and extinguishes all obligations, conditions, or restrictions flowing therefrom."And that is the closest I have found to infer that temporary orders in the case are extinguished. I would either like to find one case that says that but in place of all obligations,etc., it states any temporary/non final orders are extinguished/void/null/without affect OR I need a type of motion that has been used to officially set aside those orders.
Expert:  AttyHeather replied 6 months ago.

I have spent quite a bit of time on this and I'm not finding anything more than what I've already given you. Therefore, since it looks like you want more research, I'm going to opt out.

Expert:  Law Educator, Esq. replied 6 months ago.
Thank you for your question. I look forward to working with you to provide you the information you are seeking for educational purposes only.
I am a DIFFERENT CONTRIBUTOR, as your previous contributor has opted out.
Your previous contributor was correct and did spend considerable time with you, but here is the case that is primarily used in saying temporary orders are no longer in place when the case is dismissed s the FL Supreme Court states clearly, a voluntary dismissal under Rule 1.420(a)(1)(i) divests the trial court of jurisdiction. Randle-Eastern Ambulance Service v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68 (FL 1978). So if a court does not have jurisdiction, they could not enforce any prior temporary orders issued in the case.