Filing this in the morning could I get a proof read and any additional thoughts? I am a pro se
litigant against an attorney. This is my reply in opposition to his motion.On September 12th, 2016, Appellee filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Appellant’s motion and a Motion to Strike Appellant’s Brief. In the Appellee’s motion he asserts stipulations of rule 7.2. This must be a typographical error. It is believed that the rule that the Appellee is trying to assert may be 2.7. While the Appellant may have made a small error in regards ***** ***** page length requirement, of Loc. R 2.7(b), it was a misunderstanding that the signature and certificate of service must be inclusive of the 15 page limit, and not the egregious disregard of the rule by submitting 10 additional pages. All of the legal arguments were submitted within the 15 pages from the Appellant. The Appellee holds a complete disregard for the rule and requests that the court simply look the other way because he doesn’t believe his argument could be contained within the known parameters of this Court. Again, had the Appellee stuck to the facts of the case, he would not have had the need to consume such space.
The Federal Supreme Court has held that pro se litigants should be given less stringent standards and are allowed more latitude.
“In reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must give the complaint the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,520 (1972).”
“As pro se complaints are held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Greenhill v. Spellings, 482 F.3d 569, 572 (D.C.Cir.2007)
"Pro se litigants are allowed more latitude than litigants represented by counsel to correct defects in service of process and pleadings," Moore v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 994 F.2d 874, 876 (D.C.Cir. 1993),Second, the Appellee asserts that the Appellant violated App. R. 19, with regard to the font size of the submitted Brief. The Appellant’s Brief was submitted within the parameters of the rule with 12 point font, in Times New Roman typeface. A screen shot of the Appellant’s document is included. (Exhibit A). Even so, if there were a violation it would be harmless as Rule 2.2(B) allows a brief in non-compliance with App.R 19 to be returned to the court for reformation.
It would be prejudicial to the Appellant if this court were to accept Appellee’s 25 page brief. The accelerated calendar does not allow for the filing of reply briefs, so the Appellant would be at a significant disadvantage. The brief runs afoul of the rule requiring 15 pages for brevity so that the proceedings maybe expedited.
If the Appellee’s brief weren’t full of frivolous and unmerited arguments, he would not need additional pages. In the first paragraph on page 9 the Appellee states, “…[Crystal] … does not arrange for the children to socialize outside of limited church and therapy sessions, and the children are otherwise not involved in extracurricular activities or other activities.” The second paragraph on page 9 reads, “…there is ample evidence that Crystal was not getting the children proper medical and mental care.” Reversely, on page 10, in the first full paragraph, the brief states, “Additionally, testimony was provided by Ashley and the GAL that Crystal’s unilateral decisions regarding the children’s medical and social events were made to interfere with Ashley’s parenting time and interaction with the children.”
If the children were not receiving medical care or being socialized in the first place, how could the Appellant’s decisions interfere at all with the Appellee’s parenting time? Not only did the Appellee fill the brief with nonsensical arguments, he is stalwart in his opposition to the rules of this court.
The Appellee makes statements of law that are not, in fact, law. In the second sentence of the second paragraph on page 9, the Appellee asserts that it is required by law to vaccinate children. This is not the law in Ohio or Indiana, further the brief is used to argue against Appellant’s constitutional rights regarding her religious convictions. He argues facts of the case that were known to the court prior to the last post motion decree, such as the Appellant’s court approved relocation to Indiana in 2011. Among other things he claims that the Appellant was reading from the Separation
Agreement when in fact, as indicated by the transcript (TR., p. 423, ln 25), she was reading from the State Standard Order. (Third full paragraph, p. 18 of Appellee Brief). The brief indicates that the Appellant stated in trial that the Appellee was not responsible for extracurricular charges per the statement read in court. The counsel for the Appellee had the Appellant read from the State Standard Order and not the Separation Agreement, which states in Article IV