Hearsay is created by statute but as you will see there is also caselaw addressing the issue.
(1) Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded Statements.
Rule 106 permits the admission contemporaneously of any other part of a writing or recording or any other writing or recording which “ought in fairness” be considered at the same time. Prior Illinois law appears to have limited the concept of completeness to other parts of the same writing or recording or an addendum thereto. The “ought in fairness” requirement allows admissibility of statements made under separate circumstances.
(2) Rule 406. Habit; Routine Practice.
Rule 406 confirms the clear direction of prior Illinois law that evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice.
(3) Rule 408. Compromise and Offers to Compromise.
Prior Illinois law did not preclude admissibility of statements made in compromise negotiations unless stated hypothetically. Because they were considered a trap for the unwary, Rule 408 makes such statements inadmissible without requiring the presence of qualifying language.
(4) Rule 613(a). Examining Witness Concerning Prior Statement.
Rule 613(a) provides that a prior inconsistent statement need not be shown to a witness prior to cross-examination thereon. Illinois Central Railroad v. Wade, 206 Ill. 523, 69 N.E. 565 (1903), was to the contrary.
(5) Rule 801(d). Statements Which Are Not Hearsay.
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) codifies an Illinois statute (725 ILCS 5/115–10.1) that applies only in criminal cases. It makes admissible as “not hearsay” (rather than as a hearsay exception) a prior inconsistent statement of a declarant who testifies at a trial or a hearing and is subject to cross-examination, when the prior inconsistent statement was given under oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or under other specified circumstances. The rule does not apply in civil cases. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) also codifies an Illinois statute (725 ILCS 5/115–12). It makes admissible as “not hearsay” a declarant’s prior statement of identification of a person made after perceiving that person, when the declarant testifies at a trial or hearing in a criminal case and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement. Rule 801(d)(2) provides substantive admissibility, as “not hearsay,” for admissions of a party-opponent.
(6) Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Statement by a Party’s Agent or Servant.
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) confirms the clear direction of prior Illinois law that a statement by a party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, constitutes an admission of a party-opponent.
(7) Rule 803(13). Family Records.
The requirement that the declarant be unavailable and that the statement be made before the controversy or a motive to misrepresent arose, Sugrue v. Crilley, 329 Ill. 458, 160 N.E. 847 (1928), have been eliminated.
(8) Rule 803(14), (15), (19), (20) and (23).
With respect to records of or statements in documents affecting an interest in property, reputation concerning personal or family history, and concerning boundaries or general history, and judgments as to personal, family or general history or boundaries, Illinois law in each area was sparse or nonexistent.
(9) Rules 803(16) and 901(b)(8). Statements in Ancient Documents.
The 30-year limitation to real property, Reuter v. Stuckart, 181 Ill. 529, 54 N.E. 1014 (1899), is relaxed in favor of 20 years without subject matter restriction.
(10) Rule 804(b)(3). Statement Against Interest.
Rule 804(b)(3) makes applicable to the prosecution as well as the defense the requirement that in a criminal case a statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability is not admissible as a hearsay exception unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
(11) Rule 806. Attacking and Supporting Credibility of Declarant.
Rule 806 dispenses with the requirement of an opportunity to deny or explain an inconsistent statement or conduct of an out-of-court declarant under all circumstances when a hearsay statement is involved. Whether Illinois law had already dispensed with the requirement with respect to a deposition was unclear.
(12) Rule 902(11). Certified Records of Regularly Conducted Activity.
Self-authentication of business records is provided by Rule 902(11), following the model of Fed. R. Evid. 902(11) and 902(12) and 18 U.S.C. 3505.
(13) Rule 1004. Admissibility of Other Evidence of Contents.
Rule 1004 does not recognize degrees of secondary evidence previously recognized in Illinois. Illinois Land & Loan Co. v. Bonner, 75 Ill. 315 (1874). In addition, it is no longer necessary to show that reasonable efforts were employed beyond available judicial process or procedure to obtain an original possessed by a third party. Prussing v. Jackson, 208 Ill. 85, 69 N.E. 771 (1904).
(14) Rule 1007. Testimony or Written Admission of Party.
The Rule 1007 provision that testimony or a written admission may be employed to prove the contents of a document appears never before to have been the law in Illinois. Bryan v. Smith, 3 Ill. 47 (1839).