The CR STone Concrete case law, in my opinion is quite clear. Once a party brings a dispute to the court, and the debtor has been appropriately served notice
of a legal action pending, that person is subject to the personal and subject matter jurisdiction of the court, and the court can, pursuant to law and equity
, resolve the dispute between the parties -- even if the defending party dies in the process.
The issue resolved in the CR Stone Concrete case, cited previously, is which types of claims are and are not extinguished by the debtor's death. It seems entirely clear to me that an involuntary bankruptcy petition is not extinguished, merely because the debtor dies after being served notice of the pendency of the action -- because were that true, then the CR Stone Concrete court would have simply determined that the entire case was dismissed, and there would have been no need for a detailed discussion of the various claims which can or cannot be dismissed by virtue of a debtor's death during the pendency of a bankruptcy action.
Were the petition filed but not served before the debtor died, then that would be a different matter -- because without service of notice of the action, the court cannot establish jurisdiction over the debtor. But, your facts state that the debtor is served notice of the involuntary petition. Assuming service meets the constitutional standards (reasonably calculated to provide notice and opportunity of a legal action pending and the opportunity to appear and defend), then the case can move forward pursuant to FRBP 1016 and FRCP 25.
I think you are attempting to distinguish between involuntary and voluntary bankruptcy proceedings in a manner that has no relevance to whether or not the court can proceed with the case. It wouldn't matter that the case was an "involuntary" bankruptcy action, or an "involuntary" civil rights action for race discrimination. The case is not dismissed merely because the defendant dies.
Hope this helps.